No.1 March 1997
Foreign Direct Investment in Southeast Asia Since the 1980s：
The Implications of Regional Economic Integration
Rueyling Tzeng
Institute of European and American Studies
Academia Sinica
Abstract
Regional economic integration is s trend since the mid 1980s. This paper aims to analyze how it has impacts to the foreign investment in Asia. First, this paper agree with the previous research that the upsurging investment in the mid 1980s in Southeast Asia from Japan and Asian NICs is caused by the macro-economic factors rather than by the institutional arrangement of ASEAN. Second, analying the foreign direct investment from the European Community, the United States and Japan between 1983 and 1992, this research find out that the formation of EC92 has diverted some foreign investment from Asian developing countries to the less advanced countries in Europe but economic integration in the Americas has not diverted foreign investment to the Latin American. The latter may suggest that the degree of economic integration in a region is a less important factor in attracting foreign direct investment than others such as the political stability and the potential economic growth. Finally, the different paths of economic development taken by Asia and Latin American countries lead this paper to suggest that if the regional economic integration is going to become an institutional arrangement in Asia, it will probably follow the European model rather the American..
No.2 March 1997
Exports, Growth and Dependancy: A Preliminary Study of ASEAN-5
Chin-fen Chang
Institute of Sociology (Preparatory Office)
Academia Sinica
Abstract
本論文是中央研究院歐美研究所「台灣東南亞地區、與西方區域經濟整合間的 關係」主題計劃中的一部份。近二十年來東南亞國協五個創始會員國的經濟快速發展 是全球有目共睹的。在出口導向的政策下，除了新加坡之外，其餘四國都相當依賴初 級產品做為出口的大宗。本文指出，此一情況似乎並不如依賴學者所預期的，對出口 國的長期經濟發展造成不良的影響。至於和核心國的貿易，東協五國都與美、日關係 密切，新加坡興區內其它國家之間的貿易關係十分密切，儼然是扮演此一經濟區域內 核心國的角色。東協各國之間的貿易往來也相當頻繁，只有菲律賓屬於例外。文章最 後論及，隨著區域經濟整合的實際需要增加，過去以單一國家或地區做為分析單位的 理論架構正面臨著衝擊。
No.3 April 1997
亞太轉型、區域成長圈與永續發展
蕭新煌
中央研究院 社會學研究所
Abstract
從二次大戰後到一九九零年代中葉，亞太地區陸續經歷了前所未有的四波發展大轉型。第一波始於一九六零年代的日本現代化；第二波是在一九七零年代末後繼興起的台、韓、港、星「東亞四小龍」的經濟奇績；第三波是一九八零年代末期在中國沿海和東南亞所展現的強勁成長潛力；到了一九九零年代，第四波則是跨國、跨區域的成長圈（成長三角）的出現。
本文回溯了前三波亞太大轉型所帶來的亞太形象提升，也分析了隨伴這三波轉型所形塑出現的亞太民間社會多樣化發展態勢，亦評介了構成第四波轉型的十一個區域成長圈的內涵及其潛在的功過。在結論中，本文更提出了永續發展新典範的四個共識和原則，期許亞太各國的民間社會能在區域政治力（政府）和區域經濟力（財團、企業）之外，發揮監督、匡正和制衡的區域社會力，以引導第四波亞太轉型能走上永續發展之路。
No.4 May 1997
Southeast Asian Countries’ Service Industries in Globalization of the World Trade
Chin-Ming Lin（林欽明）
Assistant Research Fellow
Institute of European and American Studies Academia Sinica Taipei, Taiwan
(886-2) 789-9390 ext 241 FAX: (886-2) 785-1787
cmlin@eanovell.ea.sinica.edu.tw Revised May 1997
Abstract
Paper prepared for a project for Program for Southeast Asian Area Studies (PROSA), Academia Sinica Because the advanced countries occupy the lion’s share in world trade, they are both each other’s main trading partners and the main trading partners of each less developed countries. This also means that trade between advanced countries typically means trade with another country that has similar resources, technology, etc., while for less developed country, it usually means trade with countries of very different characteristics. Thus, domestic markets of most LDCs may be too small to attract Triad interest, but their emphasis on domestic market power and rent extraction made them ready targets for protectionist lobbies. With increasing prominence of multinational corporations, international production may involve more than two countries as locations for production, and international trade may be conducted within a single company. Foreign investment becomes central method for international competition.
ASEAN is highly dependent on intra-Asian exports. However, the main players of the region are Japan and the four advanced developing countries. Nevertheless, since the United States remains a major market for the ASEAN’s exports (20% of its world total), ASEAN plays at most a minor role in the emerging Asian bloc. Growing regionalization in Europe and North America is reinforced by globalization. But there are asymmetries in inter-regional relations. Beside from overall bilateral imbalance in EC-Japan and U.S.-Japan trades, Japan’s foreign trade is remarkably characterized by its low level of intra-industry trade. This is also illustrated by abnormally low import volumes of Japan compared to those of other industrialized countries.
We explore in this paper (1) The role of services in ASEAN countries in supporting and coordinating with other industries, local or foreign, to expand markets particularly of the Triad countries in which case the vertical coordination of production takes precedence. (2) How services industries, especially those associated with foreign investment, in the ASEAN countries cultivate local markets which are expanding gradually in which case the horizontal coordination of production is paramount.
No.5 June 1997
發展中的東南亞中產階級：
對馬來西亞、印尼、泰國與菲律賓中產階級形成之評析
龔宜君
中央研究院 東南亞區域研究計劃一般博士後學者
張景旭
國立台灣大學社會學博士
Abstract
The increase of the relative size of the middle class in Southeast Asia has made them a prominent social category that no other social forces can ignore. In fact, the middle class is invited by the dominant political forces to be an ally in the ruling coalition. The controversy over whether the middle class in Southeast Asia can be seen as a democractive force in the political transition has caught the attention of concerned parties, including researchers, states and NGOs. The modernization school contends that the rapid economic development gives rise to a middle class, which in turn brings the process of democratization. However, the proposition is an oversimplified viewpoint without thinking through the complexities of the political economic structures of Southeast Asian countries.
In the four countries we examined, the relationship between the middle class and the authoritarianism is different from one country to another. Two variables of the four countries are closely examined in this review article, first, the autonomy of the middle class relative to the state, secondly, the differentiation within the middle class. In Malaysia, the growth of the middle class is dependent on the state. There is no phenomenon indicates the middle class is becoming the agent of democratic transition. The only component of the middle class structure in Indonesia that leaned to democratization is the members of some NGOs and some intellectuals. On the contrast, in May 1992 Bangkok witnessed Thailand‘s first middle class revolt against the military rule. A mobile telephone mob on the street catches the attention of many political observers. It reveals the fact that an autonomous middle class is emerging in Thailand. Finally, in Philippine, the state is eager to seek for the help from the growing middle class in order to gain the autonomy from the strong and vest interested landed oligarchy.
No.6 August 1997
東南亞華人經濟成就與跨國
龔宜君
中央研究院 東南亞區域研究計劃一般博士後學者
Abstract
In the 1990s, many popular political and cultural commentators as well as financial analysts have heralded the coming of “Greater China Economic Zone” or the rising Asia. The Greater China refers to a borderless entity of ethnic Chinese, dispersed throughout China, Southeast Asia, Hong Kong and Taiwan. Often, those observers’ attention has been focused on the transnational ethnic Chinese business networks and the reasons behind their economic achievements. In this paper, the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia is to be studied. It examines various determinants of economic success of Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese, maintaining that the economic success of the ethnic Chinese over other indigenous people cannot be solely explained by the (ethnic) cultural factor. Other historical structural factors, such as the colonial policy, the emigrant experiences, and the market conditions should be considered. This paper also explores the conception of a “transnational Chinese business network”, discussing how the network was formed, and what function of the network has played for the ethnic Chinese economies.
No.7 Sept. 1997
印尼華商、台商與日本政府之間：
日治初期台商的東南亞經貿活動(1895-1919)
林滿紅
中央研究院近代史研究所
Abstract
Based upon a great deal of Japanese archives and Chinese newspapers collected worldwide, this paper draws the following findings about the relation among Indonesian overseas Chinese merchants, Taiwanese merchants, and Japanese government for extending Taiwan's trading network to Southeast Asia during the period of 1895-1919:
1. It is the Indonesian overseas Chinese merchants who turned into Japanese nationals rather than Taiwanese merchants or Japanese government's southeast-Asian southern-advance policy that opened such network which was mainly constituted of the sale of Taiwan's paochong tea to Indonesia.
2. Reasons for the Indonesian overseas Chinese merchants to turn into Japanese nationals include:1)To gain higher legal status vis-a-vis the Chinese in Indonesia; 2) to open stores in Taiwan so as to ship Taiwan's tea directly to Southeast Asia which can save tariff, navigation expense, and exchange cost entailed by going through the old routes to ship indirectly through Amoy;3)Japan had gained several war victories between 1895 and 1919,and Japanese successful propaganda in Fukien illustrates well the contrast between China's unrest and Taiwan's stability; 4) Central government's support for overseas Chinese merchants' investment in China could not be implemented in the local area with much gentries' opposition, while Japan showed much willingness to cooperate with the overseas Chinese merchants.
3.After the overseas Chinese merchants opened Taiwan's green tea trading network to Southeast Asia, Taiwanese merchants followed up and even overrode the overseas Chinese merchants in the following decades. Accompanied with the direct trade routes to Southeast Asia, Taiwanese merchants had stepped forward for accumulating their own international trade experience.
4.Though turning into Japanese nationals, the leading Indonesian overseas Chinese merchant proposed to promote Confucianism for East Asian cooperation, named the bank in mind as the bank of the Yellow Emperor, and conversed with Japan's famous Confucian entrepreneur Shibusawa Eiiji by Chinese handwriting. The overseas Chinese merchants' Chinese cultural attachment was vivid. Even the Taiwan green tea sold to Southeast Asia was kind of Fukiense subculture as it was the kind of tea preferred by the Fukienese. After the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, Mitsui company replaced some Taiwanese tea compradors' commercial network with the United States for Oolong tea market. Some of these Taiwanese merchants joined the paochong tea trade to Southeast Asia. Hence, in the process of colonization, it reveals both subordination and autonomy.
5.The Indonesian overseas Chinese merchants' expansion to southeast Asia was made possible by the world economic boom started from 1870s onward. It is not until the First World War of 1914-1919 which withdrew the European merchants back home that Japanese government paced up its southeast Asian southern advance policy and approached the Indonesian overseas Chinese merchant for extending the business of Taiwan Bank. Before 1914, Japanese government was preoccupied with its northern advance policy to defend against Russia's southern encroachment. Here reveals the intricacy of international history around Taiwanese merchants' Southeast Asian trading activities during the period of1895-1919.
Between Materialism and Post-Materialism: The Addicted Middle Class of Singapore
Lau-Fong Mak
Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian StudiesTamkang University, Taiwan
Address: Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Tamkang University, Tamsui, Taipei, Taiwan.
chehang@mail.tku.edu.tw
ian78@pacific.net.sg
Address: Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Tamkang University, Tamsui, Taipei, Taiwan.
chehang@mail.tku.edu.tw
ian78@pacific.net.sg
Abstract
There are already a few definitions on class or middle class, including the Singapore government own version. The present paper definition of middle class follows a modified Goldthorpe class scheme which guided our 1992 survey. Our focal analysis is on the Singapore middle class’ political attitude and behavior, social and cultural values, and the lifestyle of its members.
Judging by its general outlook and disposition, the Singapore middle class is still very much immersed in the sea of materialism, and has yet to set up an agenda to enter the era of post-materialism.
The most striking features of the Singapore middle class are its emphasis on familism and its exceptionally high proportion of home ownership. The majority of its members are found to be very contented with their economic well-being to the extent of avoiding risky engagements. They show signs of social conservatism, political apathy, economic complacency, and few of them appreciate artistic and cultural activities.
On the other hand, familism is about making provisions for the children to have a good life and to cultivate their full potentials. Such provisions require incessant accumulation of wealth. But familism is traditionally a common Asian value and that would leave the hand of the economic provider to explain the Singapore middle class’ addiction to materialism.
Liberal vs. Illiberal Democratization:
The Case of Southeast Asia
Kenneth Christie
Dept. of Comparative Politics
University of Bergen, Norway
Abstract
One of the most dynamic regions of the world economy, Southeast Asia, has recently asserted political and cultural claims to explain their successful transformations. This paper examines the claims and assumptions behind this "new" form of Asian democracy which has called into question the longstanding assumption concerning economic development and democracy.
It asks whether the Southeast Asian response to rapid economic growth and modernization will prevent political liberalization and makes the case that the latter is merely delayed, not postponed indefinitely. The paper further looks at these relationships and in particular the tensions between modernization and political liberalization in this region.
No.10 Dec. 1997
初論日本南進政策下台灣與東南亞的經濟關係
陳慈玉
中央研究院 近代史研究所
Abstract
The "nanshin ron " (the idea of Southward Advance ) appeared in Japan early in 1880s. After the First World War, Japan got the right of possession over Micronesia and the former German territories in the South Pacific. Taiwan became a Southward Advance base in her attempt to control Southeast Asia. The Zaibatsu, who traded all over the world and invested in Southeast Asia, became the pioneers of this policy. Besides Zaibatsu, the colonial government in Taiwan began to survey the institutions and economic conditions in Southeast Asia. After 1935, Japan strengthened the expansion southward with state power. As a result, character of purely economical Southward Advance policy changed to one of political-economic nature.
As a colony, Taiwan must coordinate the main production with the profits of Japan. Tea industry was a good example. Japan merely produced green tea and exported it to USA besides supplied the domestic market. The Oolong tea of Taiwan, which also exported to USA from the latter part of 19 century, might affect the superior position of Japan’s tea in USA market. The Taiwan Authorities encouraged Mitsui Zaibatsu to invest in black tea factories and export it to Japan, Europe and USA. Moreover ,Taiwan’s paochong tea mainly exported to Southeast Asia to supply the consumption of overseas Chinese and aborigines.
After the latter part of 1930s, The Zaibatsu in Taiwan began to import the mineral resources of Southeast Asia to develop the heavy industries under the Japanese banner of “Daitoa kyoeken”(Greater East Asian co-prosperity). In other words, Japanese Zaibatsu made full use of Southeast Asia’s natural resources and Taiwan’s rich electric power to produce strategic materials. By this way, they served their country and accumulated the valuable experiences. These historical legacy influenced the social political economies of post-war Japan , Taiwan and Southeast Asia.
No.11 April 1998
The Malayo-Islamic World in Southeast Asia
Lau-Fong Mak
Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Tamkang University, Taipei
Abstract
Southeast Asia is conceived to be segmented into four ideologically different entities, namely, the Malayo-Islamic World, the Buddhist Land, the Chinese Culture Area and the Circle of Christianity. Diversity in the region makes it an excellent laboratory for testing paradigms. We begin with ranking Southeast Asian countries by economic and demographic indicators. We see regional variations in socio-economic development as a result of religious secularization and meritocracy along ethnic lines; and colonial legacy as a mediating factor in the relationship system. The present paper attempts to sketch a profile of the Malayo-Islamic World.
After presenting the level of economic growth of most Southeast Asian countries, we trace the four waves of foreign influences brought into the region by the Arabs, the Indians, the Chinese, the Europeans and the Japanese, focusing on their impact on the traditional Malay society.
The paper sources out some critical literature for defining the Malay race and the Malayo-Islamic world, and this includes the Sejarah Melayu, Hikayat Abdullah, Undang-Undang Melaka, The Malay Dilemma, and others related to the practices of adat and syriah laws. Islam has been portrayed as a religion that is not conducive to economic development, and the followers are also seen as more concerned with otherworldly affairs. This explains why under strong political leadership aspiring for economic advancement there arises resistant, fundamentalist movements.
We discuss also the impasse of the Southeast Asian Malayo-Islamic World on the choice of a model for economic development. While the ideal model is one that is grounded in the religious worldview, the ultimate choice increasingly appears to be a pragmatic one.
We feel that, however, to keep a balance between the seesawing Secularists and the Fundamentalists is what most political leaders have been doing, and in fact what they could and would continue to do.
No.12 April 1998
The Religious Life Of Malay-Muslims
Liaw Yock Fang
Department of Malay Studies
National University of Singapore Department of Malay Studies
National University of Singapore
Abstract
The Malays are presently the dominant race in Malaysia and Negara Brunei Darussalam. In addition, Malays are found in the East and South of Sumatra, the Riau Archipelago and along the coast of many of the Islands of Indonesia (e.g. Sulawesi). Further, there are also Malays in the southern provinces of Thailand (Patani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun), and the southern provinces of the Philippines: the Mindanau, the Palawan Islands and the Sulu Archipelago. In Singapore, 14.1% of the 3.04 million people are Malays.
The paper begins with a definition of the word “Malay”. There are several definitions of the word “Malay”. This paper follows the “narrow” or ethnological definition. A brief history of the Malays is then given; followed by a definition of Muslim. The main thrust of the paper, however, is “to be a Malay is to be a Muslim”. This is reflected in the term “masuk Melayu” ( to be a Malay) used to refer to those who were converted to Islam.
Indeed, a Malay’s life is regulated by Islam and controlled by syariat, “the road which a Muslim must go through”. The paper goes on to describe how syariat influences a Malay’s life. This is followed by a discussion on the Islamic belief, the six articles of faith, the five pillars of Islam, the working of Islamic law and how a Malay Muslim’s life is affected by it. The paper ends with a discussion of fatwa ( Islamic rulings) issued by various religious councils in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
No.13 April 1998
Shifting Cosmologies of Culture and Religion
in Malaysia: Adat, Islam and Modernity
Wazir Jahan Karim
School of Social Sciences
Universiti Sains Malaysia,Penang
Abstract
Interpretations of political culture, gender relations, personality and personhood have in history and contemporary life, revealed conflicting and complementary ideas of adat and Islam. This paper discusses these fundamental constructs of the Malay World through social history and contemporary life and concludes that the increasing formalisation of Islam in political and social life has contributed to cultural depletion vis-a-vis adat. However, the increasing recognition of traditional knowledge among academicians, politicians and urban professionals has also supported popular thinking of the necessary and practical fusion of culture and religion in a plural society.
No.14 April 1998
Islamic Legal Thought and Practices in Contemporary Indonesia
Masykuri Abdillah
Faculty of Shari'ah & Center for the Study of Islam & Society (PPIM)
State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Jakarta
Abstract
Islamic law has been practiced in personal, social and political life since the Prophet period until the coming of western colonialists in most Muslim countries. Islamic law once became a positive law in Islamic caliphates, sultanates and kingdoms, including Indonesian. The coming of Western colonialists to Muslim countries brought about reducing the existence of Islamic law among its adherents, although in the subsequent development the reception of Western law in most Muslim countries was introduced by political elites themselves. The reception has three forms, firstly, taking only a certain part of Western law conducted in the frame of legal reform based on Islamic law (shari’ah); secondly, adopting Western law entirely as national law conducted in the frame of political secularization; and thirdly, taking a big part of Western law conducted in the frame of the development of national law, recognizing a small part of Islamic law as positive law. The second and third forms have faced oppositions from the Islamic revivalism in most Muslim countries in the world, which demands the implementation of shari’ah entirely. Yet the Islamic revivalism also supports the first form of legal development, namely taking a certain part of Western law considered as compatible with Islamic law, especially concerning administrative affairs or in the formulation of state regulations.
Although the majority of Indonesian people are Muslims, this country is neither an Islamic nor a secular state. Most of its national law even incorporates Dutch colonial legacies which are secular in nature. In this country only Islamic family law has been legislated as positive law; and most Muslim leaders seem to consider that the legislation of Islamic law is enough in family law only. For other laws, it is more appropriate to integrate their principles or values into national law. This is perfectly possible, especially within the framework of legal development intended to establish national law produced by the Indonesian people themselves. Besides, Islamic law does not become a national law, a big part of it has been living law implemented consciously by its adherents. They can implement Islamic laws on workshop without restriction, as well as on social law concerning private matters, such as Islamic banking. These functions necessitate the understanding of Islamic law dynamically; and in fact, Indonesian ulama have developed new legal opinions or reinterpretations of certain respects of Islamic law in accordance with the existing societal problems, such as on adat, jihad and riba, etc.
No.15 April 1998
The Coming of Islam to Thailand
Jaran Maluleem
Institute of Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies
Chulalongkorn University
Abstract
Islam spread to South-east Asia Since the end of the 7th century. It was brought to South-east Asia by merchants from the Middle East and from India as well as from the Muslims in Indo-China. The land called “The Southern Sea Islands” (Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes and Malakka) which formerly believed in Hinduism changed to the belief of Islam when Arab merchants came to this area for the first time in 846 A. D. In Indo-China the Arab and Persian merchants and Muslim preachers came to this area during 618-906 A. D. After Islam reached South Asia, it entered Malaysia and then came to the South of Thailand. Malakka played a great role of spreading Islam to South-East Asia. Pattani became a Muslim community because of the influence of Malakka.
Islam had already existed in Thailand before the Sukhothai period (about 1357 A.D.) which is considered the beginning of Thailand’s history. It means that Islam had existed in the area before the Thai (Tai) people moved from Yunnan in China. Muslims in the southern part of Thailand are aborigins who settled in the Malayan Peninsular since 43 B.C in the kingdom of Langkasuka.
Nowadays, among Mulsims in Thailand, those who are the offsprings of the Malaysian people constitute the largest group. Other groups are the Chams, the West Asian, the South Asians, the Indonesians, the Chinese Muslims, the Samsams, and the original Thais. Though Muslims are a minority group in Thailand, Muslims in the south of the country (Narathiwas, Pattani, Yala and Satul) are the majority in the area. The culture, traditions and customs of Muslims in these provinces are different from those of the other parts or even form those in other provinces in the same part. They like to use Yavi language instead of Thai language. They have their own local customs and traditions.
Editor’s note on Spellings’s note on Spellings: Due to source reasons, geographic terms and terms related to Islam may be spelt in a number of ways. For easy reference, the following list is helpful.
Malakka= Malaka= Melaka= Malacca
Pondoh= Pondok
Satul= Satun
Selebes= Celebes
Sharia= Shariah= Shari‘ah= Shariah= Syariat
Yavi= Jawi= Javi
No.16 May 1998
The Investigation Of Housing Policy In Singapore
覃怡輝
中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所
Abstract
This paper is divided into four parts: introduction (theoretical concepts), development, features and comments (evaluation). From the viewpoint of theoretical concept, the objective of housing policy in Singapore is no longer to pursue for a place to live or to own, but to improve the quality of the housing. It is found that it is not possible to achieve the policy goal within a short period of time or without necessary efforts. Many lessons can be learned from the historical development of housing policy in Singapore. The emphasis of housing policy in Singapore has been put on the principles of neighborhood, racial harmony, social relations and security and economic opportunity. However, the achievement of housing policy in Singapore is based on many necessary requirements and not without costs and prices. Some side effects are even unavoidable.
No.17 May 1998
The Business Network Formation Between The Taiwanese Investors And Ethnic Chinese In Southeast Asian
蕭新煌 龔宜君
中央研究院東南亞區域研究計劃主持人、社會學研究所籌備處研究員。
中央研究院東南亞區域研究計劃博士後學者。
Abstract
Undoubtedly, any cross-border business operation is always has embedded in both economic and social-political practices. This paper discovered that the business network formation between the Taiwanese investors and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries has been established through existing socially embedded ties and manufacturing subcontract system and concluded that the ethnic affinity between Taiwanese investors and local ethnic Chinese has indeed contributed to the making of Taiwanese business investment in Southeast Asian countries. This paper has further identified another kind of "Taiwanese experience" of local Taiwan-educated college graduates that may actually has become an emerging cultural-institutional base of business network that many Taiwanese investors have utilized and employed in Southeast Asia.
No.18 May 1998
Foreign Workers' Subjective Evaluations Of Their Employers And The Taiwan Society
蔡宏進 台灣大學 農業推廣學系
蔡明璋 中興大學 社會學系
Abstract
This research aims to study foreign workers' subjective evaluations of their employers, working conditions, the Taiwan society, the government and foreign labor agencies. In this exploratory analysis, we collected attitudinal data of 123 workers from Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines and attempted to delineate the possible factors in explaining the variations in their attitudes. Statistical results have indicated that (1)the Philippines workers have shown more positive responses in our test items; and (2) the industry, working conditions and the type of employers are important variables in shaping the attitudes of foreign workers. Although the surveyed sample registers high level of overall satisfaction, some state policies are likely to create repressive effects.
No.19 June 1998
The Financial Crisis In Thailand :Causes, Conduct And Consequences
Laurids S. Lauridsen
Dept. of Geography and International Development Studies
Roskilde University, Denmark
Abstract
The financial crisis in Thailand was a "private sector failure". During a period when the real economy showed signs of weakening with sluggish export and an increase in the current account deficit, "hot money" flowed in and covered the deficit, but also led to careless investments. Financial liberalization in an uncontrolled financial sector led to misallocation and mismatching.
The gradual loss of competitiveness during the l990s was aggravated by the foreign exchange regime which tied the baht to a strengthened US $. The current account deficit widened and reached a level that worried currency traders in the post "tequila-crisis" period.
The Barnharn and the Chavalit governments were fundamentally unstable and unable to present a reliable macro-economic policy. When the government intervened it was in a "too-late-too-little-fashion", normally with strong policy formulation followed by weak policy implementation. The political crisis aggravated the financial crisis by undermining investors' confidence. The two governments - as the governments before them - proved to be unable to implement more long-term strategies that could improve productivity in and upgrading of the industrial sector -restructuring away from low cost assembly manufacturing towards higher value-added production areas. Major issues such as the low level of basic education, the shortage of skilled labor and technical skills, high interest rates and the powerful commercial banks, an inefficient bureaucracy, an insufficient infrastructure, and a low technological capacity in private companies were never addressed in any consistent manner by the state. 'Short-termism' also prevailed in the private sector where investors went for "easy profits" in the financial and property sectors or invested in joint ventures with foreign capital in manufacturing.
Financial liberalization and the free flow of capital into an economy with an uncontrolled financial sector has aggravated these deficiencies in the Thai model of accumulation as has globalization of financial capital. Mobile finance capital was quick to reward open economies during the early l990s but equally quick to punish them when current account balances became "too large" and investments in the stock and real estate markets too risky.
In the last quarter of 1997 an IMF-driven austerity and financial sector restructuring policy was introduced and implemented. This policy aimed at restoring foreign investor confidence and if this policy works out, Thailand will in some years return to the economic growth pattern which fueled growth during the decade prior to 1996. Although the devaluation of the baht will make it easier to exploit static comparative advantages, based on relatively cheap but productive labor and abundant natural resources, long term economic development will still depend on its ability to develop dynamic competitive advantages, just as its broader social and political development will depend on its ability to solve its problems of regional and social inequality in the country.
No.20 June 1998
TO THE PRECIPICE AND BACK:ASIA'S FINANCIAL TURMOIL
Yue-man Yeung
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Since July 1997, Asia from South Korea to Indonesia has been rocked by a series of financial crises that have severely tested the stability, confidence and life in most countries along the western Pacific Rim. The Asian economic miracle has lost its lustre. Indeed, the repercussions of Asia's financial turmoil have been felt around the world, particularly in October 1997, when major stock markets in all continents plunged.
What are the causes for the sudden turn of economic fortunes in Asia when growth in recent years had been so robust and the general mood was euphoric anticipating the advent of the Pacific or Asian century? A brief survey is made of accelerating forces of globalization since the early 1980s and of specific national development policies in Asia that precipitated the financial crises.
Is the financial firestorm that has swept the region over? Or, is this a temporary lull before economic recession sets in? Financial analysts are divided in their assessment of the future outlook. What implications have the financial crises for the development prospects of Asian countries as a new century is about to dawn?
No.21 June 1998
Under Siege? Economic Globalisation and Chinese Business
in Southeast Asia
Henry Wai-chung Yeung
Department of Geography
National
Abstract
To some observers, economic globalisation has led to the end of the nation state and geography. It is assumed that globalisation erodes national differences and geographical heterogeneity. This globalisation discourse has a life of its own because it shapes neoliberal thoughts in economics and politics. In this paper, I attempt to challenge this "strong globalisation" reading of the global political economy. I argue that instead of leading to a "borderless" world, economic globalisation continues to reinforce national diversity in the face of global capitalism. This argument is particularly relevant to the recent economic crisis in Southeast Asia where Chinese business serves as a dominant mode of capitalism. Through two case studies of Chinese capitalism, I argue that globalisation is a highly contested process. On the one hand, it poses a serious threat to the practice and social organisation of Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia. The recent collapse of Peregrine Investment Holdings is a good example of how globalisation has put Chinese business under siege. On the other hand, globalisation presents opportunities for such social institutions as Chinese business firms to take advantage. The latest move of the Malaysian Government to relax its 27-year old bumiputra equity ownership restrictions to allow more equity ownership of local companies by non-Malays and foreigners exemplifies both the pragmatic response of nation states to globalisation and the unintended opportunities opened to Chinese capitalists. Taken together, this paper argues for a historically- and geographically-contingent reading of the impact and processes of economic globalisation. It also provides some implications for Chinese capitalism in Southeast Asia under globalisation.
No.22 July 1998
In Search of 'Synergetic' System of Promotion in Southeast Asia:
The Case of Japanese Multinationals in Comparative Perspective
Shigeto Sonoda
Abstract
Recent development of Japanese multinationals in Southeast Asia has provoked the discussion on the issue of "localization" of management, and the build-up of a system of promotion is recognized as necessary for effective HRM. But whenever a system is designed, the "Japanese factors" and the "local factors", seem to clash each other, and that makes it imperative to search for a 'synergetic' system of promotion.
But what factors are important in building up such promotion system? What are the distinctive features of Southeast Asian countries? In what aspect that the differences can be observed among them?
This paper addresses these problems by analyzing the data we collected from about 100 subsidiaries of the Japanese multinationals in Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and North America in 1995-96.
Roughly speaking, the demand from the local employees in Southeast Asia, whose evaluation of "promotion chance for local employees" is lower than other regions, has shown the "intermediate" features between that in the Northeast Asia stressing "human factors" as a criteria for promotion and that in the merit-oriented North America. But at the same time, several differences within Southeast Asian countries can also be observed. For example, the case of Thailand regards "human relationship" as a crucial factor for promotion, while in Indonesia such factor is not viewed as much significant.
Finally, the strategy for future research is suggested on the basis of experience in conducting surveys in Southeast Asia.
No.23 Oct 1998
Southeast Asian Security System: Theory and Practice
Cheng-Yi Lin
Research Fellow, Institute of European and American Studies
Abstract
As the Cold War has come to an end the security system in Southeast Asia has undergone tremendous change. Implementing the concepts of comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security, countries in Southeast Asia have begun to initiate security dialogues in order to enhance regional security, stability, and prosperity. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN ) has been the primary driving force behind the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) since its first meeting in Bangkok in 1994. Foreign ministers from ASEAN members, observers, and dialogue partners have used the ARF to exchange views, air differences, and reach consensus on security issues for the Asia Pacific region. In addition to the official security dialogue forum, the ASEAN has also been greatly involved in the shaping of Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), whose members include major strategic and international studies institutes in the Asia Pacific region.
The aim of the ARF is to defuse regional tensions by sustaining a network of security dialogues. However, North Korea and Taiwan are excluded from the ARF and, ironically, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait are two of the potential points of conflict in the Asia Pacific region. Whether the ARF can manage to constrain China’s assertiveness in the dispute in the South China Sea remains to be seen.
One may argue that the ARF is powerless because most of the ASEAN members have not repudiated their external bilateral security agreements. Instead, they have increased joint military exercises and strengthened defense cooperation with extra-regional countries such as the United States and Australia. This indicates that ASEAN states will not be willing to rely solely on the ARF for their security. On the other hand, the CSCAP has gotten the countries of the Asia Pacific region to hold ongoing security dialogues and serves as a think tank for the ARF. Participants from North Korea and Taiwan have been involved in the activities of these CSCAP working groups and this has helped compensate for the weakness of the ARF mechanism .
No.24 Oct 1998
A Comparison of Traditional Shop-house in Hoi-An, Veitnam and Lu-Gang, Taiwan
黃蘭翔
中央研究院 臺灣史研究所籌備處
Abstract
In the past decade, scholars from Japan have positively involving in the study and restoration work of Hoi-An shophouses in Vietnam. Furthermore, they have been supported by their government with the provision in human and material resources. Since then, much has been achieved. What remains in Hoi-An came evidently under strong influence by the shophouses in the southeastern coastal areas of China; however, current Japanese study shows shortcoming with lack of such a viewpoint. This paper attempts to investigate Hoi-An shophouses as a building type, comparing between those in Hoi-An, Vietnam, and Lu-Gang, Taiwan, to serve as a basis for further inquiry.
Similarities and differences are analyzed and compared, via a close look in the following features, including the scale and the spatial layout, the aisle-in-the-center and the aisle-on-the-side, the interlocking rafters at the ridge and the girder bearing gable, the quadrangle interior roof well, the positioning and facing of ancestral tablet, and the narrow central column bay. Both being culturally Chinese in essentiality, Hoi-An maintains its unique architectural characteristics. Result from this comparison will contribute to a better understanding of Vietnamese architecture, as well as a case exhibit of the shophouses in the southeast coastal areas of China, it will also shed light on the future study towards the diffusion, evolution and formation of such building type.
No.25 May 1999
Ethnic Chinese Business (Research) in Southeast Asia
Edmund Terence Gomez and H. H. Michael Hsiao
Abstract
Since the early 1990s, there has been a growing academic interest in the operations of ethnic Chinese business in Southeast Asia. This burgeoning interest in Chinese enterprises has coincided with increasing focus on the business opportunities available in mainland China. Many major regional magazines and even scholarly publications all have forged several popular notions about the great potential economic impact and the extensive interlocking business networks of ethnic Chinese capital in Asia. However, many of them are fraught with misconceptions, mainly because there is a paucity of empirical evidence to substantiate those presumptions.
Recognizing the limited research on ethnic Chinese business, and that this has contributed to many misconceptions of how Chinese enterprises really operate in Southeast Asia, a workshop was organized by PROSEA-Academia Sinica in November 1997 bringing together scholars who have been undertaking research on Chinese business in the region to identify the key areas of research on ethnic Chinese business in each Southeast Asian country. This articles is intended to provide a review of research already published on Chinese business in the five countries in Southeast Asia where the Chinese have established a prominent presence in the economy – Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.
No.26 May 1999
The Overseas Chinese Network: Forms and Practices in Southeast Asia
Lau-Fong Mak and I- Chun Kung
Abstract
Networking is universal and instinctive, and Overseas Chinese networks are just one such variety. Networking among the Overseas Chinese in general, and the Southeast Asian Chinese in particular, may be analytically differentiated into two major varieties. The Primary Network is characterized by particularism or ascribed traits and the Secondary Network by achievement and professionalism. These Southeast Asian Chinese networks are actively operational not only in their respective local economy and society, but also in the region as a whole, extending into the markets in Taiwan and Mainland China.
However, the networking criteria are not stagnant. The components constituting any Overseas Chinese network, like those in most other networks, change in response to societal development. This paper attempts not only to identify the various networks, but to identify their varying components as well. Empirical data on the social network linking Taiwan investors and Taiwan graduates in Malaysia are used to explicate the forms and practices of the network. The network seems to be appealing to trading and the Small- and Medium-sized enterprises.
No.27 Aug 1999
A Survey on Batak and Minangkabau Traditional Houses in Sumatra, Indonesia
Lan-Shiang Huang
Abstract
The hypothesis of this article is that the traditional architecture throughout the area from southern China to South-east Asia in the ancient time was a pile-dwelling type. Although some researchers have tried to find evidence to explain the similar architectural characteristics between southern China and South-east Asia, the hypothesis has not yet clearly elucidated.
This article is just a beginning of the full study on the pile-dwelling type houses of South-east Asia. First, no matter how the cases are seen from the patrineal or the matrineal systems, evidences so far show that the extended family members living under one roof, a proof of the ‘house society’ found both in southern China and South-east Asia. Second, almost all village communities in the area studied own their community center, which is called the men’s house, as a place for meeting and sleeping for young single men. Third, although different ethnic group have their own unique culture, but their settlement reveal the same feature of fortification by means of walls or plants due to the need of protection from the enemy’s attack.
More historical materials and study efforts are needed to verify the above mentioned hypothesis of the existence of the pile-dwelling houses in southern China and South-east Asia.
No.28 Feb 2000
Growth and Welfare ? A First Look at the Recent East and Southeast Asian Experience
Sven E O Hort and Stein Kuhnle
Abstract
A widespread perception has long prevailed among international organizations, economists, and many mass media in the West, that rapid economic growth in East and Southeast Asia has been achieved without development of social policies, and consequently, the argument has followed that growth without social welfare is not only possible, but beneficial to further economic growth. The paper questions these perceptions and beliefs and asks: is growth without social welfare possible? What has actually happened to social policy development in the countries of 'economic miracles' in East and Southeast Asia? These questions form the background for the paper which sheds light on three topics: 1) to what extent East and Southeast Asian countries delayed the introduction of social insurance schemes compared to European pioneering countries in the sense of introducing them only at a much higher level of 'modernization'; 2) to what extent the economic miracle achieved by some of these countries was based on (or accompanied by) attempts to forestall or retrench welfare state schemes; and 3) to what extent the recent financial crisis (of the Summer of 1997) has led to attempts at lowering/changing standards of social protection. The paper is based on some preliminary analysis of social policy development in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, The Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and with some references also to China and Japan. The study suggests that if proportion of labour force in the non-agricultural (non-primary) sector of the economy is taken as an indicator of 'modernization' or development, it appears that East and Southeast Asian countries introduced the two first social insurance laws at a lower level of modernization than European pioneering countries. The Asian countries have not been social security late-comers in terms of 'developmental time'. The study also finds a striking similarity between European forerunners and the Asian states in the patterns of sequence of introduction of social security for different purposes or needs, with some kind of accident or occupational injury insurance enacted first, and with unemployment insurance normally being introduced last. The paper finds furthermore that a lot of social security activities took place during the intense 'miracle growth period' 1985-1995. Although differences between countries existed and persisted, many reforms were introduced, and many programs expanded. As to what has happened after the crisis summer of 1997, information is more sketchy, but many examples of continuous social reform activity to expand social protection can be seen, most pronounced in the most democratic countries like South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan. The tentative general conclusion is that rapid and strong economic growth have been followed by state action for social security institutions and programs in the 'miracle economies' in East and Southeast Asia; that the sudden and severe economic crisis has not stopped further social reform activity; and that the most democratic regimes are more actively developing social programs than other regimes.
No.29 Mar2000
Modeling Islamization in Southeast Asia: Brunei and Singapore
Lau-Fong Mak
Abstract
The main objective of the study is to empirically construct two models of Islamization as against the ideal typical. An ideal type of a Full Islamic State (FIS) requires all subjects of a state to be Muslims and that Islam be the state religion. At the other extreme of the continuum is the State of Modernized Muslims (SMM) where the demographically Muslim minority is highly modernized, and where Islam is not a state religion. Brunei approximates the FIS model and Singapore the SMM model. The present inquiry focuses particularly on specific Islamization, or Islamization of the Muslims, in the two Southeast Asian countries, through examining personal socio-religious behavior and institutional religious arrangements.
We conducted direct observations on the Muslims’ socio-religious behavior in public and semi-public spheres, supplemented by interviewing ten families in each country on the Muslims’ al religious observance in private. For easy identification and on most occasions, female Malay Muslims are the principal subjects under direct observation.
The collected data allow us to construct two models of Islamization and the two models show that on the whole the Muslims are reasonably lax in their observance of the five pillars of belief and related Islamic prescriptions, especially in the domains of ethnic relations and economic globalization. The two models are distinguishable from each other in their respective totality, as well as in their corresponding components. Muslims in the SMM model show considerable laxity in most social and religious observance, as compared to the FIS model. Rather unexpectedly, two measuring components are in a reverse direction. Twice as many Muslims in the SMM as in the FIS pay zakat and conduct daily prayers. The former is explained by the effect of a national social welfare scheme, while the latter by the notions of blanket blessing and development anxiety.
The study suggests that Practical Islam, being a product of multiculturism, multiracialism and experience of colonization, has moved toward a Multiple Applications paradigm from a Zero-Sum paradigm. By and large, Southeast Asian Islam continues to respond to economic globalization and ethnic relations, resulting in the Muslims’ constant construction and reconstruction of socio-religious reality.
No.30 Mar 2000
Icons of Identity as Sites of Protest: Burma and Thailand Compared
Craig J.Reynolds
Abstract
Academic interest in heritage and “the invention of tradition” has obscured some important features of the way national communities remember their pasts. While governments, institutions and powerful individuals insist on what they deem to be authentic in the past, various groups or individuals may contest that authenticity. These representations of authenticity (monuments, sculptures, shrines) can incite feelings of great passion; the desecration and dishonor of sacred sites can provoke violent acts.
In this paper I pursue the discussion of authenticity of the past by comparing two famous but very different national sites in Myanmar and Thailand. What these two sites share is that they are key elements in the narratives of the Burmese and Thai nations. In Burma the Shwedagon Paya is first and foremost a religious object of devotion, and it has a long history, dating from before the Bagan period. The paya remained under British military control from the second Anglo-Burmese war in 1852 until 1929. Since that time it has frequently been the source of mass meetings and protests, most recently in 1988 when Aung San Suu Kyi gave a stirring speech. In it she identified herself as the political heir of her father, General Aung San, the founder of the Burmese army and arguably the founding father of the Burmese nation-state. In Thailand Democracy Monument dates from 1940 when it was built to commemorate the eighth anniversary of the fall of the absolute monarchy. In the mid-1970s it entered popular consciousness when huge demonstrations in October 1973 ushered in a new era of Thai politics.
I conclude the essay with some comparisons between the Shwedagon Pagoda and Democracy Monument. The Shwedagon must be recognized as a palladium of the Burmese nation-state, an authentic symbol of Burmeseness, but it is also a platform for the expression of popular sentiment, a monument whose meanings for Burmese people cannot be determined on their behalf. Like Democracy Monument, the Shwedagon is a site where the nation may beg to differ with the state.
No.31 Mar 2000
Debating Asian Values: Saying Too Little or Saying Too Much?
Mab Huang
Abstract
This paper describes and analyzes the debate on human rights and Asian values. It is primarily concerned with the positions of some authoritarian governments in Asia and scholars sympathetic to Asian values. The former, it is argued, had been motivated largely by their desire to maintain power while the latter easily succumbed to nostalgia or apology. As a result, the authoritarian governments tend to have little to say on Asian values; they were much exercised by resentment and criticism of the West. In contrast, the scholars are inclined to expand the scope of their discourse, dealing with God, religion, spirituality as well as national identity; in a word, saying too much. In conclusion, this writer proposes a different approach to the debate: take seriously Chinese and Asian liberalism, examine its strengths and weaknesses and pay heed to its future development.
No.32 June 2000
Asian Values and Communitarian Democracy
Yi-Huah Jiang
Abstract
Discussions about Asian values seem to get more attention among political scientists in the past few years than ever before. Proponents and opponents of the "Asian way" usually argue with each other along the line between universalism and particularism. My article, however, tries to approach the issue from an angle different from the "universalism vs. particularism" perspective. I shall argue that both sides of the debate could learn, and should learn, from their adversaries as to how collective values are to be understood, and how a democratic system should be improved if the goal of engagement is not to persuade one's rivalry accept his formula, but to reflect upon the shortcomings as well as the strength of liberal democracy. To illuminate my point, I will first reconstruct the controversy into a four-part typology of arguments, according to their answers to the questions that whether there is a distinct set of Asian values, and that whether liberal democracy is an adequate political institution for Asian countries. Then I will analyze, in the second section, what the term "Asian values" actually means, and what its problematic is. In the third section, I will examine the idea of an illiberal form of democracy, be it called communitarian democracy or Confucian democracy, and repudiate it as a feasible alternative to liberal democracy. My rejection of the talk of Asian values and illiberal democracy, nevertheless, does not imply that the prevalent liberal democracy is a perfect paradigm which needs no improvement or enrichment. A democracy based on liberal values, but also attuned to civic virtues and mutual concerns, would help us visualize a horizon beyond the muddy debate of Asian way.
No.33 June 2000
Concepts of Statecraft in Vietnam
David G. Marr
Abstract
Between 1010 and 1945, seven royal dynasties rose and fell in Vietnam. With varying degrees of skill, rulers formulated strategies, managed their followers, dealt with sudden challenges, and arranged the succession. After a brief discussion of relevant historical sources, this essay posits the following hypothetical set of pre-colonial statecraft priorities in Vietnam:
1. Security of the monarch and his immediate family;
2. Reliable supply of grain to the court;
3. Management of the ruler’s extended family and allied clans;
4. Defense against enemies, domestic and foreign;
5. Stewardship of the spiritual realm;
6. Economic initiatives;
7. Education;
8. Justice; and
9. Cultural benefaction.
The existence of a royal dynasty did not necessarily mean that the monarch monopolized state power, nor even that the royal family was always the principal focal point of contests for power. Much of the time the center of gravity rested with a cluster of major families or clans, each of them linked to the royal family and active at court, but also determined to maintain and enhance their own contingent of adherents, land holdings and peasant producers.
In a brief conclusion, the essay speculates about why Vietnamese monarchs did not succeed in destroying the power of the big clans in the manner of Ch’in Shi Huang-ti or Han Wu-ti in China. At one level, Vietnamese rulers lacked the economies of scale of Chinese rulers that might enable them to concentrate resources and dispatch big armies to trouble spots. At a deeper level, however, Vietnamese emperors never managed to awe their subjects to the degree prevalent in China and Japan, nor was respect for hierarchy as deeply entrenched throughout society.
No.34 June 2000
Chinese and Malay Identities in Southeast Asia
Anthony Reid
Abstract
In our world of identity labels, the English terms China and Chinese, and their European and Southeast Asian equivalents, have been made to serve an extraordinary variety of ethnic, linguistic, cultural, historical, racial and political purposes. This paper traces these homogenizing terms in European languages back to fifteenth century Southeast Asian practice, whence they were adopted by Italian and Portuguese travellers who first encountered Chinese traders there through a Malay linguistic idiom. Despite the Chinese propensity to marry locally and cross ethnic boundaries in all centuries before the twentieth, “China” remained a simplifying label in Southeast Asia from that time, ripe to be used by colonial powers to create an exclusive category opposed to “native”. Modern nationalisms have made the dividing line between “Chinese” and “Malay” (or its modern Archipelago successor “Indonesian”) a tense and sometimes explosive one. The categories Chinese and Malay were remarkably similar as commercial diasporas up to the eighteenth century, before this modern dichotomizing took hold.
No.35 June 2000
The Rules of the Name Game
In Insular Southeast Asian Societies
Lau-Fong Mak
Abstract
有意撰寫這本手冊已是十年前的事了。事緣有一天在台北收看電視台播送有關波斯灣之風雲時，有些電視台稱伊拉克總統為「沙達姆」，有些則稱之為「海珊」，亦有將全名譯作「沙譚胡先」的；總統僅有一名，授名則數個。
去年印尼政局動盪不安，全世界的大眾傳媒皆矚目於該國的人事變動；許多平時在國際上本是寂寂無聞的印尼人，一瞬間聲名大噪。另一些在國內本是家喻戶曉的人物，一經外電發佈開來，卻變得聲名大「糟」。除了僅有單一姓氏的如蘇卡諾和蘇哈托外，其餘大部份的名人的名（字）稱（謂）都變得亂七八糟。他們之中有些是父冠子戴，另一些人則乳名冠名交替，不一而是。世界上的總統不在乎冠本名或被冠父名的，捨當今印尼總統無他人矣。
姓名本已繁雜多端，再加上各類的頭銜、封號、和種姓，更令人感到丈二金剛。再由於頭銜等有時比其本人的名字來得更長，且先後位置又不一，解讀壓力之大，可想而知。
若國際知名的通訊社都難以掌握這地區的人名與稱謂，一般的電視台、報刊、及依賴大眾傳媒資料做研究的學者，就真的坎坷無人知了！
使到這區域的人名與稱謂變得凌亂無章，雖曰國際通訊社難辭其咎；竊以為當事人之自以為是或願投外電所好，亦責無旁貸。
本研究報告所引用的資料是多方面的：訪談、實地觀察、電話本子、國際圖書編例、當地報刊、國際期刊、電視新聞廣播、以及有關命名、稱謂及封銜的專書等。所涵蓋的族群主要是散佈於馬來西亞、汶萊、新加坡、菲律賓及印尼的馬來回教徒。其他較大的族群如爪哇族、巽他族、峇里人、華族、及印度族等亦占有相當篇幅。
本研究的結論是每個族群都有其一套傳統的命名與稱謂方式；而「單一姓氏」、「雙名無姓」、「子連父名」及「本名連姓」這四大類型，都流行於本地區。由於各種環境的改變（如殖民、放洋及時尚），已不是所有的人都遵照傳統風俗去取名的，不少中東的穆斯林及東南亞的族群都已傾向於自選命名方式；而「本名連姓」的制度則為上選，這也是西方先進國的命名制度。由於在血緣及文化上的連帶關係，海洋東南亞的族群亦東施效顰一番。不過，某些人西化，並不等於傳統命名制度的破產。因此，首要的功課是把握好各族群的傳統命名方式。最壞也僅落得個抱殘守缺，卻可免於文化惡霸的臭名。
本手冊在正文之後有給讀者提供一些解讀人名的方法與步驟，並附有多個姓名稱謂列表作為參考的標準。閱後若意猶未盡，不妨逕讀所列出的文獻。本手冊的中文版本在籌備當中，希望在短期內能以雙語付梓。我在峇里島做田野時，曾就一個爪哇朋友的雙名求教於當地人，他們說：「爪哇族的名字又長又奇怪，怎樣稱呼都無所謂吧！」雖曰不能以偏概全，卻亦是一葉知秋。如果連本國人都不了解另一個族群的姓名及稱謂，這可是「族群關係」的第一章。
No.36 Sept 2000
A Comparative Study of the Social Welfare Policies in Southeast Asian Countries: The Case of Social Security
Yee-Huei Chin
Abstract
The number of employed in a country will be greater and greater when its economy is more and more industrialized. Therefore, a social security system is necessary to cater for the problems of income insecurity which are caused by the contingencies of injury, sickness, unemployment, disability, old age and death. The different human and natural circumstances and the differences of economic development among the Southeast Asian countries, bear significant influences on their respective systems of social security. Such a comparative study should be meaningful and important. Unfortunately, the result of research is not so satisfactory due to the lack or insufficiency of research data.
There are old age or retirement benefits in all nine countries in Southeast Asia, but there is no such provision in Cambodia and Laos in private sector. In case of short-term contingencies such as injury, sickness and maternity, except Cambodia and Laos, the other seven countries provide benefits for occupational injury and diseases through employer liability. The Labour Codes of these countries also prescribe general injury, sickness and maternity as employers’ liability in a given period of time.
The seven countries with old age provision in private sector adopt the system of social insurance. And the financing methods of these countries are all in the form of reserve system except one, Myanmar, which adopts the pay-as-you-go system. Among the countries applying reserve system, the order of contribution rates is totally in accordance to that of per capita GNP except Vietnam. These figures demonstrate that the higher rates of contribution have contributed to the formation of capital and the growth of national economy.
No.37 Sept 2000
Globalisation, Tele-revolution and Cyberurbanisation in Malaysia
Lee Boon-Thong
Abstract
As the world moves towards increasing globalisation and internationalisation, it is apparent that nation state borders are increasingly vanishing. This paper examines the impact of globalisation on the urban landscape and suggests that the processes of globalisation, translated into urban-industrial constructs are incremental energy inputs into the urban system that will lead to a superinduced urban development. This is because host-governments will find it increasingly difficult to cope with the pace of this exogenously-induced factor of urbanisation. Nevertheless, a new wave of globalisation, that is tied to the information technology revolution has opened up a new vista of urban space requirements and new opportunities to rebuild cities that may be free from the shackles of problematic cities. The case of Malaysia vividly reflects this trend in urbanisation. Up to the 1960s, intra-national forces, primarily governed by an import-substitution strategy controlled the processes and pace of urbanisation which was rather sluggish. However, from the 1970s to the 1980s, when the country began to focus on export–oriented industrialisation, foreign capital began to flood in and resulted in an unprecedented urban growth especially in the major urban nodes. Because of the locational predilection of the globalised manufacturing activities, the new functions were superimposed upon the existing traditional urban structures which were unable to cope with the new demands. The result is manifested in the propulsion of activities into an extended metropolitan region (EMR) which are largely ad hoc rather than planned spatial transformation. In the 1990s, as globalisation begins to merge into the realm of computer networks, cities can now respond to the new functions by creating urban spaces in consonance with the demands of the new digital society. The Multimedia Supercorridor in Kuala Lumpur may be viewed as the new process of cyberurbanisation involving the whole new paradigm of creating new cyber cities that will be tied to the constellation of world cities to ensure their competitiveness and survival.
No.38 Sept 2000
Vietnam's Caodaism, Independence, and Peace:
The Life and Work of Pham Cong Tac (1890-1959)
Tran My-Van
Abstract
The Caodai religion was born in South Vietnam in 1926. Pham Cong Tac, popularly known as Duc Ho Phap by his devotees, became its powerful leader. It spiritual centre is located in the Tay Ninh province, Northwest of Saigon. Under harsh French colonial rule the sect became both a religious and a nationalist force. In 1940 Duc Ho Phap was sent into exile in Comores, Madagascar, by the French authorities as part of their effort to curb his alleged anti -French activities. During his exile and throughout the period of the Japanese occupation of Vietnam, in part due to Caodai collaboration with the Japanese, the Caodai developed their own army. It was considered to have both a divine and a nationalist mission to bring independence and order to Vietnam.
This study offers insight into the historic development of the Caodai, including the development of their army. It focuses on the Caodai leader, Pham Cong Tac (1890–1959), the spiritual guiding force of the Tay Ninh Holy See and his political work after his return from exile in 1946 until his death in 1959. This period was most turbulent. It witnessed the re-establishment of French colonial authority and also the rise of the Viet Minh nationalist-communist force, followed by political partition of Vietnam in 1954. As a conclusion, the paper comments on this past political and military role of the Caodai in Tay Ninh, and the relevance of their history to the current suppression of Caodai by Vietnamese communist authorities today.
No.39 Oct 2000
ASEAN +3, 'Asia' Consciousness and Asian Values
Anthony Milner
Abstract
What direction will regionalism take in post-crisis East Asia? Assessing this issue will require more than a knowledge of trade and security developments. In particular, some estimate must be made of the likely future potency in the region of an ‘Asia’ consciousness – a commitment to the idea of ‘Asia’ and of ‘Asian values’ that might encourage an exclusive rather than an inclusive regionalism.
‘Asia’ consciousness and ‘Asian values’ have long aroused scepticism on the part of western commentators. The onset of the Asia financial crisis, in fact, was seen by some influential commentators as the death blow for any claims to Asian exceptionalism. This paper warns against such dismissiveness. It argues that the ‘Asia’ claims that were so prominent in the mid 1990s had a broader support than many have supposed, and that their origins lay partly in the long history of anti-Western imperialism. The Asia crisis, it is suggested, did not discredit Asian values in every quarter of the region, and in many cases actually stimulated ‘Asia’ sentiment. Familiarity with the ‘Asia’ claims in the region, it is argued, suggests that it would be unwise to be too optimistic about the triumph of an open regionalism that would welcome the United States, Australia and other Western countries as well as East Asian states.
No.40 Oct 2000
Small Islands and Small Island Societies in Theory and Practice:
Two Indonesian Cases Compared
Gerard A. Persoon and Manon Osseweijer
Abstract
Within the Indonesian archipelago there is a category of relatively small islands which occupy a special position in the sustainability discourse. Culturally they can be considered as entities because they are inhabited by one particular ethnic group, distinct from their neighbours. Politically and administratively they are only marginal areas because they occupy a subordinate position within the provincial bureaucratic structure. But economically many of them are of extreme importance. The natural wealth of these islands in terms of forest and marine resources has attracted many groups of outsiders either to harvest these resources for the world market or to protect the resources because the areas are considered as biological hot spots. In both cases these outsiders take leading positions on the islands either as traders and entrepreneurs or as protectors of endangered species. The local people enjoy little of autonomy in resource use and profit only marginally from the generated benefits. This has led to a paradoxical situation: islands rich in natural resources are inhabited by people who cannot escape from their marginalised position. This article is based on two case studies of islands in East and West Indonesia (Aru and Siberut).
No.41 Nov 2000
Is Islam Compatible with Democracy?
The Role of Religion in Civil Society and Human Rights Movements
in Malaysia since 1990
Judith Nagata
Abstract
Islam takes different forms across the world, as does democracy. Malaysia is a formal parliamentary democracy, while a conservative Islamic party, PAS, rules two rural Malay states. Over the past two decades, the record of the incumbent “secular democratic” government has been marked by corruption and a serious loss of democratic freedoms and civil rights, whereas that of PAS shows greater concern over popular welfare and rights and lack of corruption. Recent political events, following the overthrow of the deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, led to further erosion of democratic freedoms, while PAS joined an opposition alliance representing reform and human rights movements. I argue, however, that PAS has developed a split personality, supporting universalistic values with its non-Muslim partners, while promoting an Islamic state locally, which allows for (undemocratic) inequality of citizenship rights, between Malay-Muslims, Chinese, men and women. Were PAS ever to move from opposition to ruling party, the question remains as to whether its version of democracy would privilege rights of Muslims over those of other Malaysian citizens.
No.42 Feb 2001
Aceh and Indonesia: A Stromy Marriage
Anthony Reid
Abstract
It is often said in Jakarta that Aceh is so inextricably part of Indonesia that the country would unravel if this province were allowed to secede. There are two levels at which Aceh is indeed central to Indonesia. The nationalist depiction of anti-Dutch struggle for 300 years, followed by a united and unifying revolutionary struggle in 1945-9, is so dependent on Aceh that the mythology might need to be reconstructed without it. More profoundly, Aceh is part of the Malayo-Muslim civilization which forms one of the unifying pillars of the Indonesian state.
Nevertheless Aceh is so unique that its example cannot be followed by other provinces. Aceh was the only Indonesian state recognized by the world as fully independent at all times up until 1873, when it was still conducting negotiations with the U.S., Turkey, France and Britain. It is also unique in the price it paid trying to defend that independence against the Dutch in the 40 years, 1873-1913. Once a Japanese invasion became imminent, in early 1942, an Acehnese rebellion forced the Dutch to abandon the province – the only place where this happened. After the Japanese occupation, in 1945-46, a radical movement destroyed the Dutch-cultivated aristocracy of uleebalang, removing any basis on which the Dutch might have attempted to return.
This paper examines the transformation which has occurred in Aceh’s self-perception since 1976, against the long background of Aceh’s history as an independent state. It suggests the context in which progress towards a resolution of the conflict can be made.
No.43 Mar 2001
In Quest of a Sustainable Livelihood:
Conditions Underlying Ilocano Migrations in the Philippines and Beyond
Robert R. Reed
Abstract
When Spain seized the Philippines in 1565, the Ilocos coast of northwestern Luzon was a realm of small settlements, moderate population densities, and mixed economy based on fishing, hunting, trade, and shifting cultivation. The Spaniards immediately inaugurated a resettlement program to consolidate the Ilocanos in larger Christianized communities. By 1700, the Ilocos had evolved into a classic Spanish province of mutually dependent sedentary agriculturists living in villages and urban dwellers. But it was not overly settled and chroniclers continued to write about its woodlands and resources. The Ilocos thus seemed to be developing in a sustainable fashion. Change came abruptly in the mid-18th century, as the Ilocano population began to expand dramatically. It grew from 60,000 people in 1738 to 500,000 in 1887. This demographic explosion fostered profound modifications in the fragile Ilocos habitat: overcutting of forests, floods, degraded soils, gullying, and gravel wash on fertile fields. The potent combination of a growing population and environmental degradation resulted in diminishing farm sizes, property fragmentation, and rural poverty. Soon many marginalized Ilocanos began to migrate to other parts of the Philippines and beyond in search of a more secure livelihood. The Ilocano experience suggests that sustainable development cannot be guaranteed in overpopulated areas simply through out-migration. Although emigration from the Ilocos has continued unabated during the past two centuries, the region remains densely settled and is plagued by serious environmental problems (widespread deforestation, extensive erosion, quickening flood cycles, and soil degradation) rooted in interminable population growth. This paper explores Spanish designs for progress in the Philippines, its impact throughout the Ilocos in terms of land use and resettlement, and the corollary experience of Ilocanos as demographic refugees, persevering settlers, and heralds of economic change on distant frontiers.
No.44 Apr 2001
What's Different about Southeast Asian Capitalism?
Jomo Kwame Sundaram
Abstract
This paper argues that even before the 1997-98 crisis, economicdevelopment in the Southeast Asian (SEA) high performing Asian economies(HPAEs) of Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia was inferior to the Northeast Asian (NEA) HPAEs including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Before the 1990s, Southeast Asia grew more slowly despite having higher population growth rates. Such differences became very important over several decades. More importantly, SEA industrial capacities and capabilities have been quite modest, partly because of the dominant role of foreign direct investment in SEA. Not only is SEA industrialization inferior to NEA's, SEA has also done less well in terms of human resource development and income inequality. These findings are elaborated in two forthcoming books and directly challenge the World Bank's advocacy of SEA as more suitable for developing country emulation compared to NEA.
No.45 May 2001
The Management of Islamization in a Malay Society
Lau-Fong Mak
Abstract
Islamization is a global concept; the present study focuses mainly on the institutional and personal dimensions. Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Terengganu are the two locations chosen for observations and interviews. The rationale for selecting these two locations is obvious in that the former is a metropolitan and administered by the ruling and secular political party. The latter, captured recently by an opposition as well as Islamic party, is primarily a rural society. Vast differences in terms of religious development between the two locations are normally expected, especially under the operation of authority bifurcation between the Federal government and the local government. By the Malaysian Constitution, religious affair is the jurisdiction and responsibility of the state government, and the role of the Federal government is only advisory. This is one of the three major characteristics of Malaysian Islam, a variety of the so-called Practical Islam. The other two are religio-politics and the lack of a central body in regulating the nation's Islamic affairs. Given the features, institutional arrangement in areas of the conduct of pilgrimage, enforcement of Syariah law and religious education differs greatly between the two locations. On the whole, the pilgrims are getting younger, and more are urbanites and professionals. Terengganu has been evolving into a fundamentalist state in terms of religious education and enforcement of Syariah law. Institutional arrangement is a structural source of normative patterns; there are locations served as a channel for the effects and they may be conceptualized as public space, semi-public space and private space. Our data on religious presentation among the female Malay Muslims show that, in general, the religious norm is most rigid in the government offices and statutory bodies, followed by the communal setting. The dress code of Terengganu government ensures and maintains the desired level of Islamization. But there still is room over there for individual expression on presenting one's religious self, although it is well below what Kuala Lumpur can offer. In Kuala Lumpur, while about 80% of the female Malay Muslims displays religious symbols in the semi-public space, this drops to 25% and less in the public space. In the private domain, the ordinary Muslims find it easier to practice on less abstract Islamic precepts, and yet they do not give equal weights to all the key components. Most of them are most concerned about dietary taboo, Subuh prayer, and zakat payment. Many fewer of them pray five times a day, pray at Asar, at Isyak, or attend Friday sermons. The study also looks into reli